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Abstract
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search
revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in
order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process
is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information
asymmetries are mutually enforcing each other; if one is relaxed, delegated
search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is
almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration
is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In contrast
to standard adverse selection problems, indirect nonlinear tariffs are strictly
dominated.
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1 Introduction
Searching is an important aspect of many agency relationships. To name a few,
recruiting agencies are hired to search for job candidates. Real estate agents are
contracted to search for prospective tenants or housing. And insurance brokers are
employed to attract new clients. More generally, many forms of problem-oriented
thinking require searching for ideas or solutions. This includes research centers searching
for new product ideas, advocates thinking about strategies to defend their clients, and
business consultancies (or managers) looking for profitable business strategies.
This paper analyzes optimal searching when it is delegated to an agent. The
model is based on the standard (single-agent) search model, in which a problem-solver
sequentially samples “solutions” from a time-invariant distribution until she is satisfied
(McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970). Departing from the standard search model, I study
equilibrium search when the revenues are not collected by the problem-solver but by a
distinct principal.
I consider two information asymmetries governing the relationship between the
problem-solving agent and the principal. First, motivated by the aforementioned
examples, I model the agent as an expert who has an ex ante informational advantage
over the principal in assessing the prospects of searching. For instance, real estate
agents are likely better in assessing the likelihood that a house sells at a certain price
compared to house owners; recruiting agencies are likely to be better informed about
the chances of finding qualified candidates than their clients; et cetera. In an effort
to capture this notion of asymmetry, I assume that payoffs x are sampled from a
time-invariant but state-dependent distribution F (x|θ), where θ is privately known
by the agent. Second, I assume that the search process itself cannot be observed (or
verified) by the principal. This second asymmetry reflects that many search routines
are either intrinsically unobservable (e.g., thinking for ideas), or are hard to be verified
due to their soft and easily manipulatable nature (e.g., sampling a genuine buyer).
In this search environment the precise configuration of information frictions is
crucial to the delegated search process. If either of the two asymmetries occurs in
isolation, then the efficient benchmark can be sustained as a delegation equilibrium.
This holds true independent of cash constraints or the risk attitude of the agent. If,
however, both asymmetries prevail simultaneously, then each acts as a catalyst to the
1
other one, and search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too early).1
A natural question then is: how should one design the contractual arrangements
to achieve second-best optimality?
Confronted with both asymmetries, the challenge is to bring the agent to reveal
the optimal search policy (which depends on θ) and, at the same time, to induce her to
also search according to the revealed policy. It turns out that the second-best optimum
can be implemented via a menu of simple bonus contracts. Each contract pays a fixed
bonus when a previously specified target is reached, and nothing otherwise. Other
information about the realized outcome is optimally ignored.
Underlying this result is an (endogenous) misalignment between the perceived
returns to searching between the agent and the principal. Contracts that are more
sensitive to the outcome of the search process than bonus contracts are shown to
increase this misalignment in states where the agent is least inclined to truthfully
reveal the optimal search policy. Accordingly, more complex contracts make it (weakly)
more costly to learn the optimal search policy. Simpler contracts, on the other hand,
are precluded by the requirement to incentivize the agent to search according to the
revealed policy. The same logic also rules out indirect tariffs that only condition on
the realized search revenues.
This result provides a novel angle to the common practice of using bonus schemes
rather than fully state-contingent schedules to set incentives (e.g., Moynahan, 1980;
Churchill, Ford and Walker, 1993). It thereby complements a small literature that
seeks to explain why real world compensation schemes are often simpler than standard
theories would suggest.2 In particular, Herweg, Muller and Weinschenk (2010) have
recently demonstrated that bonus schemes are optimal if agents are averse to losses
relative to an expectation-based reference point.3
More generally, the paper relates to a large literature focusing on the delegation of
1Put into context of the principal-agent literature, the combination of asymmetries works similarly
to how cash constraints and risk-aversion unleash the moral hazard in traditional settings (Holmstrom,
1979; Innes, 1990). A difference is, however, that the unleashing of asymmetries in the search
environment works both ways, a point that becomes important for the second-best contracting scheme
(see below).
2Seminal examples include Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Townsend (1979) and Innes (1990)
rationalizing linear compensations schemes and standard debt contracts.
3See also Park (1995), Kim (1997), Demougin and Fluet (1998) and Oyer (2000) showing that
bonus schemes are “knife-edge” optimal under limited liability if agents are exactly risk-neutral, while
they are generally suboptimal if agents are risk-averse to only the slightest degree (Jewitt, Kadan
and Swinkels, 2008).
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certain tasks subject to contracting constraints. The delegation of search has recently
been explored by Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) and Lewis (2012).4 Lewis and Ottaviani,
however, study search over a long-term horizon, using techniques from the dynamic
moral hazard literature (Toxvaerd, 2006; Sannikov, 2008). In these environments search
revenues are decreasing in time and the central challenge is to induce the agent to
search at the right speed.
In this paper, in contrast, search is taken to take place during a comparatively
short time span and the main challenge is to learn (and induce) the preferred stopping
rule. From the view of the principal, the difficulty lies thereby in disentangling an ex
ante poor distribution of search revenues from a poorly chosen search policy. At a more
technical level, this aspect of our paper is closely related to the theory of regulation
and procurement where similar combinations of asymmetries are often taken into
account (e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1986, 1993; McAfee and McMillan, 1987).5
On the empirical side, the efficiency of search agencies has been studied in the
context of the real estate industry. In line with the findings in this paper, the literature
documents that search spells are generally inefficiently short (Rutherford, Springer
and Yavas, 2005; Levitt and Syverson, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 provides the first-best benchmark and shows how it can be implemented
as an equilibrium outcome if only one of the two asymmetries is active. Section 4
analyzes the solution to the model with both information asymmetries, and Section 5
concludes. All proofs are confined to the appendix.
2 A simple model of delegated search
There are two parties, a principal and an agent. Both parties are risk-neutral and have
unlimited access to cash.6 The principal hires the agent to operate a search technology
4For an overview of the (non-delegated) search literature, see Mortensen (1986) and Rogerson,
Shimer and Wright (2005). Multi-agent variations include Albrecht, Anderson and Vroman (2010)
and Compte and Jehiel (2010) looking at non-homogeneous search committees that jointly decide
over the continuation of a search process.
5Several other literatures are based on similar combinations of asymmetries, perhaps most notably
the seminal Mirrlees (1971) framework. See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 6) for an overview.
6Both assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the results. Maintaining them helps simplifying
notation, avoids dealing with (irrelevant) corner solutions, and highlights that any inefficiency emerging
in this search environment is unrelated to limited liability and risk-sharing.
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that yields a monetary outcome x ∈ X = [0, B]. The agent samples outcomes at
constant (non-monetary) costs c > 0 from a twice differentiable cumulative distribution
function F (x|θ), where θ is an exogenous state with support Θ = [
¯
θ, θ¯]. The prior
cumulative distribution function of θ is common knowledge, is denoted by P , and
has a differentiable density p such that p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Each time the agent
samples an outcome, she can either stop search and select any previously sampled
outcome, or continue searching. If she selects an outcome, the principal collects its
monetary value, the agent receives her remuneration, and the game end. The outside
option from not selecting any outcome and from not contracting is normalized to zero
for both parties. I restrict attention to the case where, in the absence of information
asymmetries, solving the problem is profitable in all states (E{x|θ} ≥ c for all θ ∈ Θ).
To conclude the model, let me specify an information structure. I consider two
information asymmetries.
Assumption A1 (Adverse Selection). The state θ is privately revealed to the agent
before she contracts with the principal. The principal knows the set of potential states
Θ and their distribution P (θ).
Assumption A2 (Moral Hazard). Search by the agent and the sampled selection of
outcomes cannot be observed by the principal. The value of the selected outcome is
observable and verifiable.
3 Benchmark cases
For reference, I first describe the full information (first-best) benchmark and examine
the special cases where only one of the two information asymmetries prevails.
3.1 Full information
Under full information the principal reaps the (joint) surplus and implements the
search policy that maximizes it. This is merely the standard search model. I skip the
derivation and simply state the result. For details, see e.g. McCall (1970).
Proposition 1. In the first best, the agent searches as long as for all previously sampled
outcomes it holds that x ≤ x¯FB(θ). Otherwise she stops search and selects the last-
sampled outcome. The first-best stopping rule is defined by a mapping x¯FB : Θ→ X,
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such that x¯FB satisfies:
c =
∫ B
x¯FB(θ)
(x′ − x¯FB(θ)) dF (x′|θ). (1)
Under full information, the problem is separated across states. Conditional on θ,
search continues until the agent samples a solution of at least value x¯FB(θ). The
optimal “stopping rule” x¯FB(θ) is hereby chosen to equate the marginal expected
benefit of finding a better outcome than x¯FB(θ) (the right-hand side of equation (1))
with the marginal (social) cost of continuing search c.
3.2 Only adverse selection
Consider now the case where the principal is able to observe (and verify) the sam-
pled selection of outcomes, and only faces uncertainty from not knowing the state θ
(Assumption A1 holds but not A2). In this case, the first-best search policies can be
implemented by exactly compensating the agent for her search costs. Because this
makes her payoffs effectively independent of the pursued search policy, she is indifferent
and finds it (weakly) optimal to adopt the first-best policy. I state the precise result
in the following.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption A1 holds, but the principal is able to verify the
sampled selection of outcomes. Then the first-best search policies can be implemented
by specifying a transfer T (N) from the principal to the agent, where T (N) = N c, and
N is the number of outcomes in the final sample.
Proof Sketch. Consider the first-best equilibrium where the agent accepts the contract,
pursues first-best search policies, and selects the outcome with the highest value. Under
the proposed contract T , the agent breaks even independently of her search behavior,
preventing any profitable deviation. Moreover, since returns to the principal define the
joint first-best surplus, x−N c, they are maximal (subject to the agent’s participation
constraint), precluding any profitable deviation of the principal. Q.E.D.
With only adverse selection, the principal is able to construct a contract, in which
the agent’s private knowledge about the state θ is not payoff-relevant to her. The
agent is therefore willing to reveal the state without any explicit incentives. Critical to
this contract is that the principal is able to verify the sampled selection of outcomes,
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allowing him to assess the actual search costs of the agent. This is precisely what
is prevented by Assumption A2. Under moral hazard, the principal can only form
an expectation about how often the agent sampled before selecting an outcome,
preventing him to differentiate a poor distribution of outcomes (caused by θ) from an
too early termination of search by the agent. In this sense, Assumption A2 “unleashes”
Assumption A1 by rendering the agent’s private knowledge of θ necessarily payoff-
relevant (for any non-trivial contracting).
3.3 Only moral hazard
A similar conclusion holds regarding the flipside scenario where Assumption A2 holds
but not Assumption A1. Again the first-best search policies can be implemented via
a simple contractual arrangement. Perhaps the most obvious approach is to make
the agent residual claimant, as it is then in her own interest to maximize the joint
surplus.7
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption A2 holds, but the principal learns θ prior to
contracting the agent. Then first-best search policies can be implemented by specifying
a transfer T (x) from the principal to the agent, where T (x) = −x¯FB(θ) + x.
Proof Sketch. Under the proposed contract, returns to the agent, −x¯FB(θ) + x−N c
define the joint surplus up to a constant. Search is hence efficient. There remains the
question whether both parties agree to the specified “price” x¯FB(θ). To verify this,
note that x¯FB(θ) defines the first-best expected surplus (conditional on θ). Hence the
principal reaps all the surplus, and therefore happily proposes this contract, which the
agent accepts in equilibrium since she breaks even. Q.E.D.
Again, this arrangement is not feasible if both asymmetries co-exist. The reason
is that with θ unknown the price x¯FB(θ) will be subject to adverse selection in the
original sense (Akerlof, 1970). Accordingly, adverse selection triggers the moral hazard
problem in the search environment similar to how risk aversion and limited liability
unleash moral hazard in traditional principal-agent settings.
7This requires that the agent has sufficient cash reserves and is not too risk-averse. However, there
exists an alternative scheme similar to the optimal scheme in the next section that here implements
the first best without violating limited liability and without imposing any monetary risk on the agent.
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4 Adverse selection and moral hazard
I now turn to the case where both asymmetries co-exist. The challenge for the
principal then becomes to design an incentive scheme that brings the agent to reveal
her knowledge of the state θ and, at the same time, induces her to search according to
the search policies that the principal finds optimal given θ.
Let a contract be a (possibly state-contingent) mapping Tθ : X → R, which
specifies, for every outcome x ∈ X, a transfer from the principal to the agent. Under
Assumption A2 it is clear that all incentives to search have to be self-enforcing given Tθ.
Taking into account the mapping from Tθ to search policies, the principal’s objective
is to maximize expected search revenues net of transfers. By the revelation principle, a
solution to this problem may be obtained via a direct revelation mechanism in which
the agent truthfully reports the state θ, and for each θ is assigned a contract Tθ. The
principal’s problem is then to find the optimal set of contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ.
I approach this problem as follows. Since any contract Tθ effectively designs a search
problem from the perspective of the agent, I first characterize the agent’s optimal
search policy for an arbitrary contract. With this implementability constraints at hand,
I then examine the optimization problem of the principal and obtain some defining
properties of the optimal menu. In particular, I establish the optimality of bonus
contracts. After simplifying the problem accordingly, I lastly solve for the optimal
menu {Tθ}θ∈Θ and derive the equilibrium search policies.
4.1 Implementability constraints
Once the agent has chosen a contract Tθ˜ from the menu offered to her, sequential
rationality requires that she pursues the search policy which is then optimal for her.
Since the agent is effectively facing a search problem over the transfers Tθ˜(x) specified
by the chosen contract, equilibrium search is characterized by the solution to this
search problem. The following lemma states the solution.
Lemma 1. An agent with distribution θ and contract Tθ˜ searches as long as for all
previously sampled outcomes it holds that Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ). Otherwise she stops search
and selects the last-sampled outcome. Let ψθ˜ : X×R→ {0, 1} be an indicator function,
7
such that
ψθ˜(x, T¯θ˜(θ)) =
0 if Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ), and1 if Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ).
Then the stopping rule is defined by a mapping T¯θ˜ : Θ→ X, such that T¯θ˜(θ) satisfies
c =
∫ ({
Tθ˜(x
′)− T¯θ˜(θ)
} · ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))) dF (x′|θ) , (2)
whenever
∫
Tθ˜(x
′) dF (x′|θ) ≥ c. Otherwise the agent does not search at all.
Similar to the first-best case, the optimal stopping rule T¯θ˜ equates the marginal
cost of searching c with the marginal expected benefits from finding a better outcome.
However, in contrast to the first best, the value of searching from the perspective of
the agent is now defined by T (x) rather than x. For what is coming next, it will be
crucial to formulate the solution to the agent’s problem in terms of outcomes x ∈ X.8
To ensure that Tθ˜(x) maps back into a unique solution in X, I therefore impose the
following restriction.
Assumption A3. Contracts are monotonically increasing, i.e. Tθ(x
′) ≤ Tθ(x′′) for
all (x′, x′′, θ) ∈ {X2 ×Θ |x′ ≤ x′′}.
It is well known that this assumption can be rationalized by the possibility of free
disposal; i.e., the ability of the agent to freely downscale any realized outcome x.9
Under Assumption A3, inverting T¯θ˜ then immediately defines a stopping rule in X,
given by,
x¯(Tθ˜, θ) = maxx
{
x : Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ)
}
. (3)
The following proposition formulates the resulting implementability constraints by
defining x¯(Tθ˜, θ) directly as a function of Tθ˜ (eliminating the intermediate dependence
on T¯θ˜).
8This guarantees that the Spence-Mirrlees property holds with respect to any change in the
payment scheme dT . See Footnote 11 for details.
9To see this note that with free disposal the agent can guarantee herself a payoff of T ∗θ (x) ≡
maxx′∈[0,x]{Tθ(x′)}. Hence, w.l.o.g., one could replace Tθ by Tˆθ, which for all x, pays Tˆθ(x) = T ∗θ (x),
whereas it can be easily verified that Tˆθ is indeed increasing in x.
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Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions A2 and A3 hold. Let M be the space of
monotonically increasing functions X → R. Then search is determined by a function
x¯ :M×Θ→ X, which specifies, for a contract Tθ˜ ∈M and a state θ ∈ Θ, a number
x¯(Tθ˜, θ), such that the agent searches as long as for all previously sampled outcomes
it holds that x ≤ x¯(Tθ˜, θ). Otherwise she stops search and selects the last-sampled
outcome. The stopping rule x¯ is defined by the following inequalities.
c ≤
∫ B
xˆ
(
Tθ˜(x
′)− Tθ˜(xˆ)
)
dF (x′|θ) for all xˆ ≤ x¯(Tθ˜, θ) (4a)
c >
∫ B
xˆ
(
Tθ˜(x
′)− Tθ˜(xˆ)
)
dF (x′|θ) for all xˆ > x¯(Tθ˜, θ) . (4b)
4.2 Contract properties
I am now ready to characterize the problem from the perspective of the principal.
The optimal menu of contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ is given by the solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
{Tθ}θ∈Θ
{∫
θ∈Θ
∫ B
x¯(Tθ,θ)
(
x′ − Tθ(x′)
F¯ (x¯(Tθ, θ)|θ)
)
dF (x′|θ) dP (θ)
}
subject to the constraints,
1
F¯ (x¯(Tθ, θ)|θ)
[∫ B
x¯(Tθ,θ)
Tθ(x
′) dF (x′|θ)− c
]
≥ 0 (IRθ)
1
F¯ (x¯(Tθ, θ)|θ)
[∫ B
x¯(Tθ,θ)
Tθ(x
′) dF (x′|θ)− c
]
≥ 1
F¯ (x¯(Tθ˜, θ)|θ)
[∫ B
x¯(Tθ˜,θ)
Tθ˜(x
′) dF (x′|θ) − c
]
(ICθ,θ˜)
for all (θ, θ˜) ∈ Θ2, where x¯(Tθ˜, θ) is characterized by
c ≤
∫ B
xˆ
(
Tθ˜(x
′)− Tθ˜(xˆ)
)
dF (x′|θ) for all xˆ ≤ x¯(Tθ˜, θ) (SP −θ,θ˜)
c >
∫ B
xˆ
(
Tθ˜(x
′)− Tθ˜(xˆ)
)
dF (x′|θ) for all xˆ > x¯(Tθ˜, θ) . (SP +θ,θ˜)
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The objective of the principal here is to maximize his expected payoff subject to
three kinds of constraints. First, constraints (IRθ) require that it must be individually
rational for the agent in state θ to accept contract Tθ, rather then choosing her outside
option. Second, constraints (ICθ,θ˜) require that it must be optimal for the agent in
state θ to truthfully reveal the state to the principal by choosing Tθ from the menu
of all contracts {Tθ˜}θ˜∈Θ. These constraints stem from the principal not knowing the
state θ. The third set of constraints reflect the requirement to also incentivize search
by the agent. As follows from Proposition 4, (SP −
θ,θ˜
) and (SP +
θ,θ˜
) pin down the stopping
rule x¯(Tθ˜, θ) implemented in state θ under contract Tθ˜.
Inspecting (SP −
θ,θ˜
) and (SP +
θ,θ˜
) it can be seen that for a general contract Tθ, the
implemented search policy depends on the state θ˜. In particular, off-equilibrium
search policies x¯(Tθ, θ˜) do not necessarily equal x¯(Tθ, θ). The key question guiding the
following analysis will be: what search policy should a contract designed for state θ
implement in state θ˜? An intuitive answer here is that the principal wants to design a
contract Tθ that implements a search policy in all states θ˜ other than θ that makes it
as unattractive as possible in the relevant subset of these states to choose contract Tθ.
In the following I will show that bonus contracts achieve this goal.
Before proving this claim, let me impose some structure on the distribution of
outcomes F (x|θ) and states P (θ). Let F¯ ≡ 1− F , and let H ≡ ∂F¯−1/∂x. Then:
Assumption A4. ∂H/∂θ ≤ 0, and ∂2H/∂θ2 ≥ 0.
Assumption A5. ∂H/∂x ≤ 0, and ∂2H/∂x∂θ ≤ 0.
The first part of Assumption A4 introduces a stochastic ordering over distributions
in θ. A sufficient condition for H to be decreasing is the commonly used monotone
likelihood ratio condition.10 Intuitively, the imposed ordering in H requires that at
any point of search, continuing search will yield higher outcomes—in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance—in state θ′′ than in state θ′ < θ′′. At a technical
level, this guarantees that the Spence-Mirrlees property holds in a stochastic sense.11
The second part of Assumption A4 strengthens the ordering, such that H is convexly
10Another condition which is less strict than the monotone likelihood ratio condition, and which
also implies H decreasing, is sometimes referred to as monotone hazard ratio condition.
11More precisely, Assumption A4 implies that the agent’s indifference curves between expected
transfers and different stopping rules cross only once over different states. To see this, let T eθ ≡
E{T (x) |x ≥ x¯, θ} denote the expected transfers to the agent in state θ with a given contract T ,
and let uθ(T
e
θ , x¯) ≡ T eθ − c/F¯ (x¯|θ) denote the expected utility of the agent when pursuing stopping
rule x¯. Then the single crossing property holds, if for any (θ, θ′) ∈ {Θ2|θ > θ′} it holds that
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increasing in θ. Intuitively, this requires that the benefit of being in a better state
than θ is decreasing in θ. Assumption A5 is of more technical nature, ensuring that
the objective function of the principal is concave.12
To keep the results clear, I impose two further assumptions that ensure the existence
of an interior optimum.
Assumption A6. d
dθ
( p(θ)
1−P (θ)
) ≥ 0.
Assumption A7. ∂
2
∂x¯∂θ
E{x|x ≥ x¯, θ} ≥ 0.
Assumption A6 is standard in many mechanism design applications, meaning that
the likelihood to be in a better state than θ is decreasing in θ. A sufficient condition for
this to hold is that the likelihood p(θ) is weakly decreasing in θ (e.g., θ being uniform).
Finally, Assumption A7 requires the marginal benefit of search to be increasing in θ.
Together with Assumptions A4 and A6 this ensures the optimum to be interior.13
Parametric distributions for F consistent with these assumptions exist, for instance,
within the Beta family and the (generalized) family of Pareto distributions (see the
end of the next subsection for a particular simple example).14
I am now ready to show that the principal optimally designs a menu of contracts
which is exclusively comprised of bonus contracts as defined below.
Definition. Let τ be a nonrandom constant. Then a contract T is called a bonus
contract when it is of the following form:
T (x) =
0 if x < x¯τ if x ≥ x¯ .
The argument establishes that a menu of bonus contracts implements any set of
equilibrium search policies in a weakly optimal way and, therefore, any equilibrium
− ∂uθ/∂x¯∂uθ/∂T eθ ≤ −
∂uθ′/∂x¯
∂uθ′/∂T eθ′
, which simplifies to H(x|θ) ≤ H(x|θ′). In conjunction with Assumption A3
this then ensures that indifference curves are indeed single-crossing for any differential dT , since for
any monotonic contract it holds that dT eθ ≥ dT eθ′ .
12This assumption can be relaxed to HHxθ−HxHθ ≤ 0, with subscripts denoting partial derivatives.
13In many cases Assumption A6 is not necessary. Specifically, when p(θ)/(1−P (θ)) is increasing at
a sufficiently high rate, or when H is sufficiently convex (HHθθ −H2θ ≥ 0, with subscripts denoting
partial derivatives), it can be simply dropped. For details see the proof of Proposition 6.
14Given certain regularity conditions that ensure that a first-best solution exists, the analysis in
this paper also seamlessly extends to the case where B →∞, permitting distributions for F with
half-bounded supports (e.g., the exponential distribution with F¯ (x|θ) = e−x/θ for
¯
θ > 0).
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can be implemented by a menu of such contracts. First, I investigate the implications
of a menu that consists exclusively of bonus contracts. The following lemma asserts
that in this case the optimal menu resembles many of the characteristics of a standard
adverse selection problem. In particular, I have that (IRθ), (ICθ,θ˜), (SP
−
θ,θ˜
) and (SP +
θ,θ˜
)
in the principal’s maximization problem can be replaced by (a), (b) and (c) below.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption A1–A4 hold. Let {Tθ}θ∈Θ be a menu of bonus con-
tracts, let x¯(θ) be the search targets implemented by contract Tθ, and let τ(θ) be the
transfer paid to the agent when x > x¯(θ). Then if {Tθ}θ∈Θ is a solution to the princi-
pal’s optimization program, then it is also a solution to a program where the principal
maximizes her payoff subject to the following constraints:
(a) x¯(θ) is nondecreasing in θ,
(b) U(
¯
θ) = 0, and
(c) dU
dθ
= − ∂
∂θ
(
c
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)
)
,
where U(θ) ≡ u(x¯(θ), τ(θ), θ) denotes the agent’s indirect utility in state θ (given
contract Tθ = (x¯(θ), τ(θ))).
Equipped with Lemma 2, I show the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions A1–A7 hold. Then to any equilibrium in the
game defined in Section 2, there corresponds an associated menu of bonus contracts
{Tθ}θ∈Θ, which implements the same actions and is (weakly) preferred by the principal.
The proof establishes a weak optimality of bonus contracts by showing that for any
set of search policies a menu of bonus contracts implementing these policies defines a
lower bound on the utility of the agent. To develop an intuition, suppose the principal
wants to implement the stopping rule x¯(θ) in state θ. In order to incentivize the agent to
continue search for all x < x¯(θ), he needs to provide her with a certain expected benefit
of finding x ≥ x¯(θ). Let τˆ(θ) denote the expected payment necessary to implement
this benefit.15 Then it must hold that
∫ B
x¯(θ)
Tθ(x
′) dF (x′|θ) ≥ τˆ(θ). The precise shape
of Tθ on [x¯(θ), B] is, however, irrelevant for the purpose of incentivizing the agent
in state θ and can be freely used to reduce the agent’s temptation of misreporting
15Generally τˆ(θ) depends on sup{Tθ(x) : x ∈ [0, x¯(θ)]} in conjunction with (SP±θ,θ). For small
values of the former term it is pinned down by (IRθ) instead.
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the state θ. As is typical for adverse selection problems, the relevant temptation in
this context is to underreport the state, giving the agent in all states better than θ
a stochastic advantage in finding high outcomes relative to state θ. Because of this
stochastic advantage, any schedule Tθ that is strictly increasing on [x¯(θ), B] yields
an expected return that is strictly higher than τˆ(θ) in all states better than θ. By
paying a fixed remuneration, bonus contracts eliminate this premium associated with
misreporting.16
Regarding the question which search policy should be implemented off-equilibrium,
it immediately follows:
Corollary. Let {Tθ}θ∈Θ be a solution to the principal’s optimization program. Then
without loss of generality one may assume that x¯(Tθ, θ˜) = x¯(Tθ, θ) ≡ x¯(θ) for all
(θ, θ˜) ∈ Θ2.
Intuitively, implementing any off-equilibrium search policy that stops later than
the one designed for state θ would necessarily generate a premium from misreporting
the state. Any off-equilibrium search policy that stops earlier than in state θ does
not need to be deterred.17 Accordingly, I henceforth suppress the second argument of
x¯(Tθ, θ
′) and use x¯(θ) to denote the search policy implemented by contract Tθ. With
this (and Lemma 2), we can then write {Tθ}θ∈Θ as a function of {x¯(θ)}θ∈Θ:
Corollary. The second-best optimum can be achieved by a menu of bonus contracts
of the following form. For all θ ∈ Θ,
Tθ(x) =
0 if x < x¯(θ)[F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)]−1c+ U(θ) if x ≥ x¯(θ) ,
where
U(θ) =
∫ θ
¯
θ
− ∂
∂θ˜
(
c
F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ˜)
)
dθ˜
is the minimal rent necessary to deter misreporting of θ.
16There still remains a second type of rent associated with underreporting the state that accrues
from having smaller expected costs of pursuing a particular search policy. Because of this second
rent, delegated search is still inefficient in equilibrium.
17While it is possible that x¯(Tθ, θ˜) = 0 for some θ˜ < θ, it is never necessary in these cases to deter
the agent from choosing Tθ. One may thus assume without loss of generality that x¯(Tθ, θ˜) = x¯(Tθ, θ).
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4.3 Optimal search policies
I now solve for the second-best search policies. Substituting for Tθ using the last
corollary and again using Lemma 2, the challenge of incentivizing search is effectively
solved and the maximization problem of the principal reduces to a standard adverse
selection problem. The following proposition states the solution.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumptions A1–A7 hold. Then for some (nonempty) Φ ⊆ Θ,
search is “directed”, with {x¯(θ)}θ∈Φ satisfying:
c+Dθ(x¯(θ)) =
∫ B
x¯(θ)
(x′ − x¯(θ)) dF (x′|θ) , (5)
for some x¯(θ) > 0, and where Dθ : X → R+ is defined by
Dθ(x) =

0 if x = 0
−1− P (θ)
p(θ)
∂H(x|θ)
∂θ
c
H(x|θ) if x > 0 .
(6)
For all θ /∈ Φ, search is “undirected”, satisfying x¯(θ) = 0.
Comparing equation (5) to its first-best counterpart (1), the marginal cost of
delegated search is inflated by an agency term Dθ. Dθ reflects the cost of learning
the optimal search policy: Under delegation, increasing x¯(θ) not only increases the
expected search costs, but also makes it more tempting for the agent to misreport the
search policy in states θ′ ∈ {θ′ ∈ Θ : θ′ > θ}. To offset for this additional temptation,
the principal needs to pay the agent an (higher) rent U(θ′) in all states θ′, making it
(in expectations) more expensive to search in state θ.
Since the benefits of search are the same under delegation (the right-hand sides of
(5) and (1)), we have:
Corollary. Suppose Assumptions A1–A7 hold. Then delegated search is almost surely
inefficient: x¯SB(θ) < x¯FB(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, B).
Proposition 6 distinguishes two cases. First, for all θ ∈ Φ, second-best search
policies continue to be directed towards some target x¯(θ), but the target is generally
set too low (search stops too early). Second, for θ /∈ Φ, sequential (delegated) search
is not profitable at all and the principal simply asks the agent to sample a single
outcome and to unconditionally select it as final.
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Figure 1: Second-best search.
Figure 1 illustrates the two cases. Delegated search is undirected (θ /∈ Φ) if Dθ
increases the left-hand side of (5) beyond the right-hand side for all x¯ > 0, either
because it is unprofitable to search from an ex post perspective (taking into account the
agency rents paid in θ), or because it is sufficiently unlikely to be in state θ, such that
it is not worth the increase in rents in more likely states from an ex ante perspective.
Because the agent is equally good at securing x > 0 in all states, there are no rents
from deviating to x¯ = 0 that have to be compensated. Together with monotonicity
of x¯ this implies Dθ(0) = 0 for all θ. Undirected search is therefore preferred over no
search whenever implementing x¯ > 0 is too costly.
A sufficient condition for θ ∈ Φ is c+Dθ(x¯) < E(x|θ) for a marginal x¯:
c+ lim
x↘0
Dθ(x) <
∫
x dF (x|θ). (7)
Using that agency rents U(θ′) are increasing in x(θ) for all θ′ > θ, the condition can
be shown to be also necessary.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumptions A1–A7 hold. Then θ ∈ Φ if and only if θ fulfills
condition (7).
In particular, since x¯(θ) is increasing, it follows that Φ has the following “mono-
tonicity” property.
Corollary. Let θ′′ > θ′. Then it holds that (i) if θ′ ∈ Φ, then θ′′ ∈ Φ; and (ii) if
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Figure 2: Optimal search policies.
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Figure 3: Indirect tariff.
θ′′ /∈ Φ, then θ′ /∈ Φ.
For an example, consider the case where θ is uniform on [ 1
10
, 4] and F¯ (x|θ) =
(1 − x)1/θ.18 Figure 2 displays the optimal search policies as a function of θ. The
example is chosen so that
¯
θ is the lowest value of θ for which search is (first-best)
profitable (x¯FB(
¯
θ) ≈ 0). In state θ¯, delegated search is efficient (indicated by x+ ≈ 0.81).
For all θ < θ¯, second-best search stops too early compared to the first best, and is
undirected on [
¯
θ, θ0].
4.4 Indirect tariffs
The second-best bonus scheme is arguably a particular simple scheme among the class
of direct mechanisms. An interesting question is, however, whether there also exists a
simple indirect mechanism that implements the second best. In particular, does there
exists a nonlinear (possibly discontinuous) tariff T ∗ : X → R that implements the
second best?
The answer is no. In contrast to pure adverse selection problems, any tariff T ∗
that implements the optimal search policies {x¯(θ)} is strictly more costly then the
direct bonus scheme.
18While this choice for F fails to satisfy the strict version of Assumptions A5 and A7, it is consistent
with the relaxed versions given in Footnotes 12 and 13, so that all results apply.
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Proposition 8. Suppose Assumptions A1–A7 hold. Let {x¯(θ)} define the second best
search policies and let T ∗ define the tariff that implements {x¯(θ)} at lowest expected
costs. Then T ∗ exists, and expected transfers from the principal to the agent are strictly
higher than τ(θ) for all θ > inf Φ.
Underlying this inefficiency result is that the implementability conditions (SP −
θ,θ˜
)
and (SP +
θ,θ˜
) deplete most degrees of freedom in designing T ∗. Specifically, T ∗ must
satisfy the following integral equation:
F¯ (x|q(x))T ∗(x) + c =
∫ B
x
T ∗(y) dF (y|q(x)) for all x ∈ (x−, x+), (8)
where x− ≡ x¯(inf Φ), x+ ≡ x¯(θ¯), and q(x) ≡ x¯−1(x) (for details, see the proof in the
appendix). This leaves only the shape of T ∗ on [x+, B] as a means to replicate the
second-best compensation scheme. It turns out that this degrees of freedom do not
suffice to fulfill (ICθ,θ˜) and (IRθ) at the (expected) second-best costs.
To build an intuition, note that T (x¯(θ) defines the indirect utility of the agent
in state θ, since for any x = x¯(θ) she must be indifferent whether or not to continue
searching. The key insight is that any solution to (8) is necessarily steeper than U(q(x))
(see Figure 3 for an illustration). Hence, satisfying individual rationality in state inf Φ
necessarily increases the rents in all other states beyond their second-best level. The
reason is closely related to the optimality of bonus contracts. Because T ∗ must be
strictly increasing on [x−, x+] in order to implement the (continuous) mapping θ 7→ x¯,
the agent can generate the deviation premium that bonus contracts had eliminated by
choosing x¯(θ′) in state θ > θ′. In order to nevertheless implement {x¯(θ)}, benefits of
continued search have to compensate this premium, reflected in the steeper slope of
T ∗ (defining the agent’s utility under T ∗) compared to U .
5 Summary
I have studied a model of delegated search under varying assumptions about what can
be observed by the principal. If the principal can observe either the search process or
shares the same information as the agent regarding its prospects, then delegated search
is demonstrated to be efficient. If, however, the relation between the principal and
the agent is governed by both imperfect monitoring of search and ex ante uncertainty
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about its prospects, these sources of uncertainty exacerbate each other, and search
is found to be stopped too early. In the light of this inefficiency, utilizing a menu
of bonus contracts is shown to be second-best. The scheme strictly dominates any
nonlinear (indirect) tariff.
Beyond the specific context of search agencies, the analysis may also illuminate the
delegation of certain non-routine problems. Solving non-routine problems often requires
investigating potential solutions that in the process may turn out unsatisfactory and
require further thinking until a sufficiently promising solution strategy is conceived.
Delegating such tasks resembles many aspects of the environment considered in this
paper. For instance, managers are expected to come up with good business plans,
consultants are hired to search for solutions to pending problems, and advocates need
to find good strategies to defend their clients.
The optimal utilization of bonus contracts provides theoretical support for their
widespread usage. The necessity to adopt these remuneration schemes depends, however,
on the simultaneous relevance of the two asymmetries. If learning the optimal search
policies is the main concern, a simple piece rate scheme that compensates the agent
for each sampled solution suffices. If implementing search is the main concern, then
linear payment schemes that make compensation highly sensitive to the value of the
adopted solution are found to be optimal.
Of course, the precise configuration of asymmetries is often hard to determine
for a particular application. With regards to the adopted notion of moral hazard,
I conjecture that searching for solutions in non-routine tasks is often intrinsically
unobservable, in particular when the search is of cognitive nature. Adverse selection
regarding the optimal search policy, in contrast, is expected to increase in relevance
with the expertise of the agent. I therefore suspect the delegation of search to be
particularly challenging when tasks are both non-routine and require specialized skills.
For less specialized tasks the experience of tenured agents may serve as a substitute.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let V (x|θ) denote the indirect utility of the agent in state θ after sampling x. Then:
V (x|θ) = max
{
Tθ˜(x), −c+
∫
V (x′|θ) dF (x′|θ)
}
, (9)
whereas outcome x is selected as final whenever the associated transfer Tθ˜(x) exceeds
the expected utility from continuing search. Since this expected utility is independent
of x, it holds that the agent selects outcome x whenever Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ), where T¯θ˜(θ) =
−c+ ∫ V (x′|θ) dF (x′|θ). Let ψθ˜ : X × R→ {0, 1} be an indicator, such that
ψθ˜(x, T¯θ˜(θ)) =
0 if Tθ˜(x) ≤ T¯θ˜(θ) , and1 if Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ) . (10)
Then, using (9), I can rewrite T¯θ˜(θ) as
T¯θ˜(θ) = −c+
∫ ((
1− ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))
)
T¯θ˜(θ) + ψθ˜(x
′, T¯θ˜(θ))Tθ˜(x
′)
)
dF (x′|θ),
(11)
or
T¯θ˜(θ)
(
1−
∫ (
1− ψθ˜(x′, T¯θ˜(θ))
)
dF (x′|θ)
)
= −c +
∫
ψθ˜(x
′, T¯θ˜(θ))Tθ˜(x
′) dF (x′|θ), (12)
or
c =
∫
ψθ˜(x
′, T¯θ˜(θ))Tθ˜(x
′) dF (x′|θ)− T¯θ˜(θ)
∫
ψθ˜(x
′, T¯θ˜(θ)) dF (x
′|θ) (13)
=
∫
ψθ˜(x
′, T¯θ˜(θ))
(
Tθ˜(x
′)− T¯θ˜(θ)
)
dF (x′|θ). (14)
Because any increase in T¯θ˜(θ) weakly decreases ψθ˜(x
′, T¯θ˜(θ)), the RHS of (14) is strictly
decreasing in T¯θ˜(θ). Hence, if there exists a solution to (14), it is unique. Moreover,
maxx Tθ˜(x) exists since X is compact, whereas the RHS of (14) is zero at maxx Tθ˜(x),
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implying that (14) uniquely characterizes T¯θ˜(θ) whenever
∫
T (x) dF (x|θ) ≥ c. Other-
wise, marginal costs of searching always exceed the marginal benefits, and the agent
trivially abstains from search.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
By construction of x¯(Tθ˜, θ), for some x ∈ X, Tθ˜(x) ≥ T¯θ˜(θ) (see the proof to Lemma 1).
Further, whenever search is directed, for some x ∈ X, Tθ˜(x) ≥ T¯θ˜(θ). Thus for Tθ˜
strictly increasing and continuous, x¯(Tθ˜, θ) ≡ T−1θ˜ (T¯θ˜(θ)) ∈ X obviously exists, and
is given by (4a) and (4b). To verify the remaining cases, suppose that T¯θ˜(θ) is not
attained by Tθ˜(x) on X. Then from (4a) and (4b), x¯(Tθ˜, θ) is assigned to the point
of discontinuity where limx↗x¯(Tθ˜,θ) Tθ˜(x) < T¯θ˜(θ) and limx↘x¯(Tθ˜,θ) Tθ˜(x) > T¯θ˜(θ). So
search given by x¯(Tθ˜, θ) is identical to search given by T¯θ˜(θ). Finally, suppose that
T¯θ˜(θ) is attained on an interval [¯
x, x¯]. Then from Lemma 1, the agent continues search
for all x ≤ x¯ and stops search for x > x¯. Thus x¯(Tθ˜, θ) = x¯, identical to the rule given
by (4a) and (4b).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
To proof this lemma, I first characterize the set of stopping rules x¯(θ) that are
implementable via bonus contracts. From (SP −
θ,θ˜
) and (SP +
θ,θ˜
) it follows that an agent
with bonus contract Tθ˜ = (x¯(θ˜), τ(θ˜)) chooses a stopping rule
x¯(Tθ˜, θ) =
0 if τ(θ˜) < [F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ)]−1 c, andx¯(θ˜) if τ(θ˜) ≥ [F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ)]−1 c. (15)
Accordingly, let u(θ, θ˜) ≡ max{0,−[F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ)]−1c+ τ(θ˜)} denote the agent’s indirect
utility in state θ when she chooses bonus contract Tθ˜ = (x¯(θ˜), τ(θ˜)). Note that (IRθ)
implies that τ(θ˜) ≥ [F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ˜)]−1 c, and thus I can ignore (SP −
θ,θ˜
) and (SP +
θ,θ˜
) if (ICθ,θ˜)
holds.
Moreover, Assumption A4 implies that u(θ, θ˜) ≥ u(θ˜, θ˜) for all θ ≥ θ˜. Thus,
u(θ, θ˜) = −[F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ)]−1c+ τ(θ˜) for all θ ≥ θ˜. Therefore, for the agent in state θ to
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not locally deviate, it must be that the first order condition
−H(x¯(θ˜)|θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c+
dτ(θ˜)
dθ˜
= 0 for θ˜ = θ, (16)
and the second order condition
d
dθ˜
(
−H(x¯(θ˜)|θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c+
dτ(θ˜)
dθ˜
)
≤ 0 for θ˜ = θ (17)
hold locally at θ˜ = θ. Moreover, since (16) must hold for all θ ∈ Θ, it is an identity
in θ, and thus
d
dθ˜
(
−H(x¯(θ˜)|θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c+
dτ(θ˜)
dθ˜
)
− d
dθ
(
H(x¯(θ˜)|θ)dx¯(θ˜)
dθ˜
c
)
= 0 for θ˜ = θ.
(18)
Substituting (17) in (18) together with Assumption A4 thus yields dx¯/dθ ≥ 0. This
establishes that any solution to the principal’s optimization program implies condi-
tion (a).
Next I argue that (16) is also sufficient to prevent the agent from deviating globally.
First note that in the case where x¯(Tθ˜, θ) = 0, u(θ, θ˜) = 0 ≤ u(θ, θ) and thus I can
restrict attention to the case where the agent chooses x¯(Tθ˜, θ) = x¯(θ˜) under contract Tθ˜.
Suppose to the contrary that the incentive constraint is violated in at least one state,
i.e. u(θ, θ˜) − u(θ, θ) > 0 for some (θ, θ˜) ∈ Θ2, or by the fundamental theorem of
calculus,
∫ θ˜
θ
(
−H(x¯(θ′)|θ)dx¯(θ
′)
dθ′
c+
dτ(θ′)
dθ′
)
dθ′ > 0. (19)
Suppose θ˜ > θ. Then, Assumption A4 implies that H(x¯(θ˜)|θ˜) ≤ H(x¯(θ˜)|θ), and
therefore (19) implies
∫ θ˜
θ
(
−H(x¯(θ′)|θ′)dx¯(θ
′)
dθ′
c+
dτ(θ′)
dθ′
)
dθ′ > 0 (20)
since dx¯/dθ ≥ 0. However, equation (16) implies that the integrand in (20) is equal
to 0 for all θ′, contradicting that for any θ˜ > θ, contract Tθ˜ is preferred over Tθ. The
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same logic establishes a contradiction for the case where θ˜ < θ.
Now, let U(θ) ≡ u(θ, θ). Then
dU
dθ
= −H(x¯(θ)|θ)dx¯(θ)
dθ
c+
dτ(θ)
dθ
− ∂
∂θ
c
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ) . (21)
Thus (c) holds if and only if (16) holds. Therefore, (a) and (c) are both sufficient and
necessary for (ICθ,θ˜) to hold. Moreover, as shown above, (ICθ,θ˜) implies (SP
−
θ,θ˜
) and
(SP +
θ,θ˜
). Thus I am left to show that (a), (b) and (c) are sufficient and (b) is necessary
for (IRθ) to hold. Consider sufficiency first. From (c) I have that dU/dθ is increasing
in θ (by Assumption A4 implies ∂F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ) ≥ 0). Thus U(
¯
θ) = 0 implies (IRθ) for all
θ ∈ Θ. That U(
¯
θ) = 0 is also necessary for a solution to the principal’s optimization
program follows trivially from the above analysis, since shifting U(
¯
θ) doesn’t affect
any other constraints.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider an arbitrary menu of contracts {Tθ}θ∈Θ, and let u(T, x¯, θ) be the utility
of the agent in state θ when she chooses contract T and search policy x¯. Then
u(Tθ˜, x¯(Tθ˜, θ), θ) ≥ u(Tθ˜, x¯(Tθ˜, θ˜), θ), and therefore a necessary condition for (ICθ,θ˜) to
hold is that
U(θ) = u(Tθ, x¯(Tθ, θ), θ) ≥ u(Tθ˜, x¯(Tθ˜, θ˜), θ) for all θ˜ ∈ Θ .
Hence θ˜ = θ maximizes the RHS of the inequality, with U(θ) also being the value
function of maxθ˜ u(Tθ˜, x¯(Tθ˜, θ˜), θ). The envelope theorem implies
dU
dθ
=
 ∂∂θ
∫ Bx¯(Tθ˜,θ˜) T (x′) dF (x′|θ)
F¯ (x¯(Tθ˜, θ˜)|θ)
− ∂
∂θ
(
c
F¯ (x¯(Tθ˜, θ˜)|θ)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜=θ
, (22)
and since by Assumptions A3 and A4 the first term in (22) is positive, I have that
dU
dθ
≥ − ∂
∂θ
(
c
F¯ (x¯(Tθ, θ)|θ)
)
. (23)
Moreover, (IRθ) implies U(
¯
θ) ≥ 0. Thus for any x¯ that is nondecreasing in θ, the
agent’s utility under a menu of bonus contracts as given by Lemma 2(b) and (c)
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constitutes a lower bound on the agent’s utility under any menu of contracts that
implements x¯. As long as the restriction on x¯ is not binding for bonus contracts, a
menu of bonus contracts is therefore optimal. That the restriction that x¯ is increasing
is indeed not binding is established in the proof of Proposition 6.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Using {Tθ}θ∈Θ as given by the second corollary to Proposition 5, the principal’s
objective function is
∫ θ¯
¯
θ
(∫ B
x¯(θ)
x′
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ) dF (x
′|θ)− c
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)
+
∫ θ
¯
θ
∂
∂θ˜
(
c
F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ˜)
)
dθ˜
)
dP (θ), (24)
or, after an integration by parts,
∫ θ¯
¯
θ
(∫ B
x¯(θ)
x′
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ) dF (x
′|θ)− c
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)
+
1− P (θ)
p(θ)
∂
∂θ
(
c
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)
))
dP (θ). (25)
By Lemma 2 the only relevant constraint which I have to take care of is that x¯(θ)
is nondecreasing in θ. Ignoring this constraint for the moment, the maximizer of (25)
is given by
c+Dθ(x¯(θ)) =
∫ B
x¯(θ)
(x′ − x¯(θ)) dF (x′|θ), (26)
where function Dθ : X → R+ is defined by,
Dθ(x) = −1− P (θ)
p(θ)
∂H(x|θ)
∂θ
c
H(x|θ) . (27)
(From Assumption A5, (25) is concave at any x¯(θ) that satisfies (26), so (25) is globally
quasi-concave, and the second-order condition is satisfied.)
I still have to show two things. First, that x¯(θ) as given by (26) is indeed nonde-
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creasing. Second, I have to extend the analysis to the possibility that for some θ ∈ Θ,
a corner solution might be optimal.
From Assumption A4, the RHS of (26) is increasing in θ, so x¯(θ) will trivially be
nondecreasing whenever Dθ(x¯(θ)) is nonincreasing in θ. This will be the case whenever
p/(1− P ) is increasing at a sufficiently high rate, and/or H is sufficiently convex in θ.
Otherwise, x¯(θ) will still be increasing if the RHS of (26) is increasing at a sufficiently
high rate. A sufficient condition for this to be the case is that
H(x¯(θˆ)|θ)
∫ B
x¯(θˆ)
(x′ − x¯(θˆ)) dF (x′|θ) (28)
is increasing in θ at θˆ = θ. Assumption A7 ensures that this is always the case. Hence,
any interior solution to the principal’s program is characterized by equations (26)
and (27).
Because for x¯(θ) = B benefits of search (the RHS of (26)) are equal to 0, corner
solutions may at most be given by x¯(θ) = 0. They occur whenever the left-hand side
of (26) exceeds the right-hand side for all values of x¯(θ), indicating that the “solution”
to (26) is negative. Given the constraint x¯ ≥ 0 and quasi-concavity of the problem,
we hence have x¯ = 0 as long as the principal wishes to still implement search. To see
that this indeed the case, note that the last term in (25) drops out for x¯ = 0 since
F¯ (0|θ) = 1 for all θ. Hence, for x¯ = 0 the problem collapses to the first-best problem
where per assumption E(x|θ) ≥ c for all θ ∈ Θ.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
From Proposition 6 marginal costs of searching are given by c+Dθ(x¯). Differentiating
with respect to x¯ yields
−1− P
P
(
∂2H
∂x∂θ
1
H
− ∂H
∂θ
∂H
∂x
1
H2
)
c ≥ 0 , (29)
by Assumptions A4 and A5. Moreover, marginal benefits are trivially decreasing in x¯.
Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for x¯(θ) > 0 is that for xˆ↘ 0 directed search
is beneficial:
lim
xˆ↘0
{∫ B
xˆ
(x′ − xˆ) dF (x′|θ)− c−Dθ(xˆ)
}
> 0 , (30)
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or
c+ lim
x↘0
Dθ(x) <
∫
x dF (x|θ). (31)
A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Existence Consider existence of T ∗ first. By continuity of x¯, a necessary and sufficient
condition for T ∗ to implement {x¯(θ)} is that the equivalent to (SP±θ,θ) holds with
equality for all θ in (θ0, θ¯), where θ0 ≡ inf Φ, or equivalently:
c =
∫ B
x
(T (y)− T (x)) dF (y|q(x)), (32)
or
T (x) = − c
F¯ (x|q(x) +
1
F¯ (x|q(x))
∫ B
x
T (y) dF (y|q(x)), (33)
for all x ∈ (x−, x+), x− ≡ x¯(θ0), x+ ≡ x¯(θ¯), and where q(x) ≡ x¯−1(x).19 Separate T ∗
into T− defined on [0, x+] and T+ defined on [x+, B], and fix some T+. Then T− is
given by the functional T ,
(T f)(x) = g(x) + 1
F¯ (x|q(x))
∫ x+
x
f(y) dF (y|q(x)), (34)
where
g(x) =
1
F¯ (x|q(x))
(
−c+
∫ B
x+
T+(y) dF (y|q(x))
)
. (35)
Inspecting T , it is clearly increasing in f . Moreover, for any constant k,
T (f + k)(x) = (Tf)(x) + F (x
+|q(x))− F (x|q(x))
1− F (x|q(x)) k.
By (1), x+ ∈ (0, 1), such that the term multiplying k is in (0, 1). Hence, T satisfies
Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to be a contraction, establishing existence of a unique
19Here I assume without loss of generality that ∂H/∂θ < 0, so that x¯ is invertible. If it were not, I
could simply define a new variable that treats all instances of θ where H is constant as a single state
and carry out the following analysis with respect to that variable.
25
T− for a given T+.
Having taken care of implementing {x¯(θ)}, the only other constraints to address
are individual rationality. Since T is increasing in T+, individual rationality can be
guaranteed by setting T+ accordingly. We conclude that there exists a T ∗ implementing
the second best search policies and leave it to the reader to formally establish the
shape of T+ that defines the cost-minimizing tariff. (The answer is: T+(x) = const for
all x ∈ [x+, B], where const is set such that T−(x−) = 0.)
Inefficiency Suppose there exists a tariff T that implements {x¯(θ)} at the same
costs as in the second best in all states θ ∈ Θ. Since both parties are risk neutral, this
implies that U(θ) corresponds to the second-best rents for all θ. Contradicting the
existence of such a T , I first show that T necessarily violates individual rationality for
θ → θ0. Subsequently I then argue that restoring individual rationality for θ0 requires
increasing rents for all θ ∈ Φ above their second-best level.
Let U(θ) denote the second-best rents as given by the second corollary to Proposi-
tion 5, and suppose that T implements U(θ) for all θ. Then from (33), T (x) = U(q(x)).
Hence, implementability requires
F¯ (x|q(x))U˜(q(x)) =
− c +
∫ B
x+
T (y) dF (y|q(x)) +
∫ x+
x
∫ q(x)
¯
θ
m(θ˜) dθ˜ dF (y|q(x)), (36)
for all x ∈ (x−, x+), where U˜(θ) is the actual utility implemented by T , and
m(θ) = − ∂
∂θ
(
c
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ
)
. (37)
After an integration by parts, a change in variables, and a collecting of terms, (36)
becomes
F¯ (x|q(x))U˜(q(x)) =
− c+
∫ B
x+
T (y) dF (y|q(x))− F (x|q(x))
∫ q(x)
¯
θ
m(θ˜) dθ˜
+ F (x+|q(x))
∫ θ¯
¯
θ
m(θ˜) dθ˜ −
∫ θ¯
q(x)
m(θ˜)F (x¯(θ˜)|q(x)) dθ˜, (38)
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or, after another change in variables, and substituting again for U(θ),
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)U˜(θ) = −c+
∫ B
x+
T (y) dF (y|θ)− F (x¯(θ)|θ)U(θ)
+ F (x+|θ)U(θ¯) −
∫ θ¯
θ
m(θ˜)F (x¯(θ˜)|θ) dθ˜. (39)
Consider the first two terms on the right-hand side. By Assumption A4, U˜(θ) is
maximized for all θ < θ¯, subject to U(θ¯) being fixed, by setting T+ constant. Hence,
∫ B
x+
T (y) dF (y|θ)− c ≤ F¯ (x
+|θ)
F¯ (x+|θ¯)
∫ B
x+
T (y) dF (y|θ¯)− c =
F¯ (x+|θ)
(
U(θ¯) +
c
F¯ (x+|θ¯)
)
− c. (40)
Substituting in (39) yields
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)U˜(θ) ≤
− F (x¯(θ)|θ)U(θ) + U(θ¯)− c
(
1− F¯ (x
+|θ)
F¯ (x+|θ¯)
)
−
∫ θ¯
θ
m(θ˜)F (x¯(θ˜)|θ) dθ˜ =
F¯ (x¯(θ)|θ)U(θ)− c
(
1− F¯ (x
+|θ)
F¯ (x+|θ¯)
)
+
∫ θ¯
θ
m(θ˜)F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ) dθ˜. (41)
By Assumption A4, ∂H(x|θ˜)/∂θ˜ = ∂2[F¯ (x|θ˜)]−1/∂x∂θ˜ ≤ 0. Moreover, F¯ (x|θ) is also
(strictly) decreasing in x. Hence, the last term on the right-hand side satisfies
−c
∫ θ¯
θ
∂
∂θ˜
(
F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ)
F¯ (x¯(θ˜)|θ˜)
)
dθ˜ < −c
∫ θ¯
θ
∂
∂θ˜
(
F¯ (x+|θ)
F¯ (x+|θ˜)
)
dθ˜ = −c
[
F¯ (x+|θ)
F¯ (x+|θ˜)
]θ¯
θ˜=θ
.
(42)
Substituting in (41), the last two terms on the right-hand side cancel out. Hence,
U˜(θ) < U(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ¯), (43)
contradicting U˜(θ) = U(θ). In particular, it holds that for θ → θ0, U˜(θ0) < 0 since
U(θ0) = 0. From the existence proof above, it is clear that the only degree of freedom
to restore individual rationality under the constraint of implementability consists in
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raising T+. Under Assumption A4 any change dT+ implies dU(θ) > dU(θ0) for all
θ > θ0. Moreover, since x¯ is increasing in θ, the difference between the left-hand side
to the right-hand side in (42) is decreasing in θ. Hence, any T+ that sets U˜(θ0) = 0
necessarily sets U˜(θ) > U(θ) for all θ > θ0.
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